期刊
ACCOUNTING AND BUSINESS RESEARCH
卷 53, 期 4, 页码 416-438出版社
ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
DOI: 10.1080/00014788.2021.2021502
关键词
Empire building; capital budgeting; compensation; overinvestment; underinvestment
This study examines how a company's headquarters make capital budgeting decisions and compensate managers based on their reports of decision-relevant private information. The findings show that managerial empire-building benefits can affect companies' optimal capital budgeting decisions, and the headquarters counteract the manager's desire for overinvestment through investment distortions.
I examine how a company's headquarters use an empire-building manager's report about decision-relevant private information to make capital budgeting decisions and compensate the manager. To this end, I construct a model comprising the headquarters (principal) and the manager (agent), who reports on the investment project's expected profitability. I identify the optimal investment sizes and compensation payments, where the headquarters trade off managerial information rents - arising from empire-building benefits inducing the manager to favour overinvestment - for investment efficiency. The headquarters counteract the manager's desire for overinvestment with investment distortions in the form of underinvestment (or overinvestment) for a high (or low) expected profitability. Due to these distortions, the expected compensation is not monotone in the level of empire-building benefits. Unlike previous capital budgeting studies, in this study, I show that managerial empire-building benefits can multi-directionally affect companies' optimal capital budgeting decisions and related compensation schemes.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据