期刊
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
卷 179, 期 8, 页码 2537-2551出版社
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-022-01777-7
关键词
Amodal completion; Perceptual representation; Representationalism; Relationalism; Perceptual phenomenology
类别
资金
- ERC Consolidator grant [726251]
- FWF-FWO grant [G0E0218N]
- FWO research grant [G0C7416N]
This passage discusses the problem of amodal completion and argues that relationalism cannot provide a coherent account of it. The author analyzes two options of the relationalist and highlights their lack of viability.
Amodal completion is usually characterized as the representation of those parts of the perceived object that we get no sensory stimulation from. In the case of the visual sense modality, for example, amodal completion is the representation of occluded parts of objects we see. I argue that relationalism about perception, the view that perceptual experience is constituted by the relation to the perceived object, cannot give a coherent account of amodal completion. The relationalist has two options: construe the perceptual relation as the relation to the entire perceived object or as the relation to the unoccluded parts of the perceived object. I argue that neither of these options are viable.
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