4.4 Article

Anchored strategic reasoning

期刊

ECONOMICS LETTERS
卷 212, 期 -, 页码 -

出版社

ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2022.110330

关键词

Anchoring bias; Auctions; Games; Incomplete information; Strategy

资金

  1. Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Germany [TRR 190, 280092119]
  2. Berlin Centre for Consumer Policies (BCCP), Germany

向作者/读者索取更多资源

This study proposes a model that predicts strategy adjustments based on players' beliefs being anchored to an irrelevant number.
We propose a model whereby players' beliefs about the opponents' reasoning are anchored to an irrelevant number. The model predicts that strategies are adjusted toward the anchor if they are complements. If strategies are substitutes, adjustments away are also possible. (c) 2022 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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