Unequal participation in joint new product development: The roles of information opportunism concern and contract binding force

Partners involved in joint new product development may not participate and/or contribute equally. This study identifies two types of unequal participation: unequal participation due to passive opportunism (i.e., unequal information participation) and unequal participation due to the nature of the business transaction (i.e., unequal co-developer participation). This study further examines how unequal participation may lead to joint new product development inefficiency due to concerns about information opportunism (i.e., about information collection and unauthorized use) and contract binding force. Empirical results from 400 matched channel cooperative dyads in China reveal that both unequal information participation and unequal co-developer participation hinder value co-creation. In addition, concern about information opportunism strengthens the negative effects of unequal participation on value co-creation. Furthermore, we find that the moderating effect of information opportunism concern is less likely to be negative when contract binding force is greater. These findings provide novel insights for managing inter-firm value co-creation in joint new product development.

Automated summary

This study reveals that partners involved in joint new product development often do not have equal participation and contribution. The unequal participation can be attributed to passive opportunism or the nature of the business transaction. This inequality hinders the value co-creation process in joint new product development due to concerns about information opportunism and contract binding force. The study finds that the negative effects of unequal participation on value co-creation are strengthened by concerns about information opportunism, but this negative effect is less likely to occur when contract binding force is stronger.