期刊
MATHEMATICS
卷 10, 期 5, 页码 -出版社
MDPI
DOI: 10.3390/math10050694
关键词
cooperation; selfishness; stochastic games; mixed strategy; Nash equilibrium; social optimal
类别
资金
- Spanish Ministry of Science, Education and Universities
- European Regional Development Fund
- State Research Agency [RTI2018-098156-B-C52]
- Erasmus+ program [KA107]
This paper presents a general stochastic game analysis of a network scenario with cooperative and non-cooperative players, exploring the impact of incomplete game information on utility optimization and selfish behavior on network performance.
This paper introduces a general stochastic game analysis of a network scenario consisting of a mix of cooperative and non-cooperative players (i.e., users) under incomplete game information. Users access a shared channel using the Slotted ALOHA mechanism combined with ZigZag Decoding (SAZD). Cooperative players seek to optimize the global utility of the system (e.g., throughput, delay, loss rate) regardless of their individual interests, whereas non-cooperative players act selfishly and optimize their own benefits irrespective of the impact of this behavior on others and on the entire network system. The game equilibrium is characterized by the social optimum and the Nash equilibrium, where the former is adopted by cooperative players and the latter is the equilibrium strategy of non-cooperative players. We undertake a comparative study across two game scenarios with different levels of cooperation and selfishness. Our results generally show that the information possessed by a player can determine the outcome. Furthermore, our findings show that the network performance is strongly influenced by selfish behavior, which can lead to a significant disruption of the entire system. Finally, we show a possible scenario in which the network could greatly benefit from this selfish behavior thanks to the ZigZag scheme.
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