Evolutionary game of government safety supervision for prefabricated building construction using system dynamics

Purpose This study aims to reduce the construction safety accidents of prefabricated building (PB) projects, improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safety supervision by government departments, and provide theoretical reference for improving the safety supervision system of PB construction. Design/methodology/approach Considering the information asymmetry between government supervision departments and construction contractors and the interactive relationship between the two parties under bounded rationality, we propose an evolutionary game model for the construction safety dynamic supervision of PBs and analyze the evolutionary strategy of the game. The system dynamics (SD) method is used to simulate and analyze the evolutionary game process under a dynamic supervision strategy and the adjustment of external variables. Findings The cost difference between the government's strong and weak supervision, the construction contractor's additional expenditure for strengthening safety management, and other factors affect system stability. The government can dynamically adjust the penalties based on the construction contractor's subjective willingness to ignore safety management and further adjust their rate of change based on the completion of the supervision goals to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of construction safety supervision. Originality/value This study makes contributions in two areas. Through a combination of SD and an evolutionary game, it provides new insights into the strategic choice of the main body related to PB construction safety. Additionally, considering the nonlinear characteristics of construction safety supervision, it provides useful universal suggestions for PB construction safety.

Automated summary

This study aims to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of safety supervision in prefabricated building (PB) projects and provide theoretical reference for improving the safety supervision system. An evolutionary game model is proposed to analyze the strategic choices related to PB construction safety. The study finds that factors such as the strength of government supervision and additional expenditure for safety management affect system stability. The government can dynamically adjust penalties and their rate of change based on the completion of supervision goals to improve safety supervision.