期刊
SYNTHESE
卷 200, 期 2, 页码 -出版社
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-022-03503-6
关键词
Disagreement; Epistemic peer; Conciliationism; Self-undermining; Defeasible logic
This paper first introduces the behavior of conciliatory views in cases involving higher-order disagreements, and then uses a formal model to resolve three paradoxes associated with disagreements over epistemic peerhood.
Conciliatory views of disagreement say, roughly, that it's rational for you to become less confident in your take on an issue in case you find out that an epistemic peer's take on it is the opposite. Their intuitive appeal notwithstanding, there are well-known worries about the behavior of conciliatory views in scenarios involving higher-order disagreements, which include disagreements over these views themselves and disagreements over the peer status of alleged epistemic peers. This paper does two things. First, it explains how the core idea behind conciliatory views can be expressed in a defeasible logic framework. The result is a formal model that's particularly useful for thinking about the behavior of conciliatory views in cases involving higher-order disagreements. And second, the paper uses this model to resolve three paradoxes associated with disagreements over epistemic peerhood.
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