Moving target defense for the security and resilience of mixed time and event triggered cyber-physical systems

Memory corruption attacks such as code injection, code reuse, and non-control data attacks have become widely popular for compromising safety-critical Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). Moving target defense (MTD) techniques such as instruction set randomization (ISR), address space randomization (ASR), and data space randomization (DSR) can be used to protect systems against such attacks. CPS often use time-triggered architectures to guarantee predictable and reliable operation. MTD techniques can cause time delays with unpredictable behavior. To protect CPS against memory corruption attacks, MTD techniques can be implemented in a mixed time and event-triggered architecture that provides capabilities for maintaining safety and availability during an attack. This paper presents a mixed time and event-triggered MTD security approach based on the ARINC 653 architecture that provides predictable and reliable operation during normal operation and rapid detection and reconfiguration upon detection of attacks. We leverage a hardware-in-the-loop testbed and an advanced emergency braking system (AEBS) case study to show the effectiveness of our approach.

Automated summary

Memory corruption attacks pose a threat to the security of Cyber-Physical Systems. To protect systems against these attacks, moving target defense techniques can be applied in a mixed time and event-triggered architecture. This paper proposes a mixed time and event-triggered MTD security approach based on the ARINC 653 architecture, and its effectiveness is demonstrated through experiments.