4.7 Article

Exploring the inducement for social dilemma and cooperation promotion mechanisms in structured populations

期刊

CHAOS SOLITONS & FRACTALS
卷 157, 期 -, 页码 -

出版社

PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2022.111973

关键词

Evolutionary game; Strategy dynamics; Cooperation; Complex network; Spatial game; Prisoner's dilemma

资金

  1. National Natural Science Foundation of China [62073175, 62073174, 91848203]
  2. National Key Research and Development Program of China [2018AAA0103003]

向作者/读者索取更多资源

This study investigates the internal motivation for cooperation dilemma and finds that the randomness and heterogeneity of population structure strengthen the fitness of defectors. It also reveals that the cooperative willingness of individuals in betrayal situations has a decisive impact on the cooperation level of groups. Additionally, the study proposes two innovative mechanisms, enforcement and punishment, to promote collective cooperation.
Investigating and addressing the issue of social dilemma is a continuing concern within the subject of behavioral sciences and collective cooperation. The research to date has mostly focused on outside control methods dealing with the existing dilemma rather than exploring the reason resulting in that inside. This work probes into the in-herent inducement for cooperation dilemma. We construct a gaming environment in which thousands of ran-dom memory-one strategies interact with each other on different complex topologies and record dominant strategies winning out from self-organized evolution. After clustering and analyzing evolutionary results, we find that the randomness and heterogeneity of population structure will strengthen the fitness of defectors. Besides, the cooperative willingness of individuals in betrayal situation has a decisive impact on the cooperation level of groups at equilibrium state. Further, we present two innovative treatments, enforcement and punish-ment mechanisms, to promote collective cooperation. The promoting effect is checked on various spatially networked topologies in the iterated prisoner's dilemma game. Simulation results indicate that irrespective of the underlying interaction network, the introduced promotion mechanisms are universally effective in subduing the evolutionary advantage of defectors, which favors the emergence and sustainability of cooperative behaviors. Our novel conclusions may provide some new perspectives for enhancing cooperation and elevating social wel-fare within biological systems and human societies.

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