The Sources of Political Normativity: the Case for Instrumental and Epistemic Normativity in Political Realism

This article argues that political realists have at least two strategies to provide distinctively political normative judgments that have nothing to do with morality. The first ground is instrumental normativity, which states that if we believe that something is a necessary means to a goal we have, we have a reason to do it. In politics, certain means are required by any ends we may intend to purse. The second ground is epistemic normativity, stating that if something is (empirically) true, this gives us a reason to believe it. In politics, there are certain empirical regularities that ought to be acknowledged for what they are. Both sources are flawed. Instrumental normativity only requires coherence between attitudes and beliefs, and one can hang on to false beliefs to preserve attitudes incompatible with reality. I may desire to eschew power relations, and as such imagine politics to be like a camping trip. Epistemic normativity, on the other hand, operates critically, striking down existing normative claims. It shows us that politics is nothing like a camping trip, but it doesn't tell us what we should do about it (beyond abandoning some false beliefs). We conclude by showing that if the two are taken together, they remedy each other flaws.

Automated summary

This article argues that political realists have two distinct strategies for providing political normative judgments that are separate from morality, instrumental normativity and epistemic normativity. However, both sources have flaws - instrumental normativity may lead to false beliefs, while epistemic normativity, though critical, does not offer specific recommendations. By combining the two, these flaws can be remedied.