Rethinking Integration of Epistemic Strategies in Social Understanding: Examining the Central Role of Mindreading in Pluralist Accounts

In recent years, theories of social understanding have moved away from arguing that just one epistemic strategy, such as theory-based inference or simulation constitutes our ability of social understanding. Empirical observations speak against any monistic view and have given rise to pluralistic accounts arguing that humans rely on a large variety of epistemic strategies in social understanding. We agree with this promising pluralist approach, but highlight two open questions: what is the residual role of mindreading, i.e. the indirect attribution of mental states to others within this framework, and how do different strategies of social understanding relate to each other? In a first step, we aim to clarify the arguments that might be considered in evaluating the role that epistemic strategies play in a pluralistic framework. On this basis, we argue that mindreading constitutes a core epiststrategy in human social life that opens new central spheres of social understanding. In a second step, we provide an account of the relation between different epistemic strategies which integrates and demarks the important role of mindreading for social understanding.

Automated summary

Theories of social understanding have recently moved away from the idea that only one epistemic strategy, such as theory-based inference or simulation, constitutes our ability to understand others. Empirical observations support pluralistic accounts, arguing that humans rely on a variety of epistemic strategies. This study aims to clarify the role of mindreading in this pluralistic framework and explore the relationship between different epistemic strategies. The researchers argue that mindreading is a core strategy in human social life and provide an explanation of how it relates to other strategies.