Doom and Gloom, From Structure to Human Minds: What Makes a North Korean Nuclear Deal Difficult?

Despite the uniquely dovish moment in North Korea-U.S. relations (2018-19), Pyongyang and Washington failed to make a deal in Singapore (2018) and then again in Hanoi (2019). Why did both sides fail to reach consensus on a deal, even under favorable conditions where both leaders established and maintained good relations? This article argues that Pyongyang's hesitation over sending stronger signs of denuclearization, along with Washington's discounting of the risk and vulnerability that North Korea would experience during the process of denuclearization, contributed to the failure of the negotiation between both sides. This article develops a theoretical framework about the perceptual gap between a signaler and a receiver regarding the level of cost a signaler should pay to make its conciliatory actions credible and explains the gap with a signaler's dilemma of costly signals-the situation in which the action to increase the credibility of signals increases the risks and vulnerability a signaler should take and bear-and a receiver's tendency of discounting a signaler's insecurity.

Automated summary

Despite the positive North Korea-U.S. relations, both sides failed to reach a deal because Pyongyang hesitated to show stronger signs of denuclearization, while Washington underestimated the risks and vulnerability North Korea would face during the process. This article explains the failure through a theoretical framework of the perceptual gap between a signaler and a receiver, introducing the concept of a signaler's dilemma of costly signals and a receiver's tendency of discounting a signaler's insecurity.