Standing up for Democracy? Explaining Citizens' Support for Democratic Checks and Balances

Winners and losers of elections have different stakes in protecting democratic institutions. We provide new evidence for the effects of partisanship and economic performance on support for checks and balances and acceptance of their infringement. Using survey data from 26 European countries, we show that voters who feel close to a political party that lost the elections support checks and balances significantly more than other citizens. We also find that higher satisfaction with the economy is associated with lower support for checks and balances. Our experiment in Ukraine shows that supporters and opponents of the governing party have divergent evaluations of a reform potentially infringing on the independence of the judiciary. Those in opposition find such reforms less acceptable and justified. Again, we find that improved economic performance leads to higher acceptance of judicial reform. Our results confirm that citizens' support for checks and balances is contingent and volatile.

Automated summary

Winners and losers of elections have different stakes in protecting democratic institutions, with partisanship and economic performance influencing support for checks and balances. Supporters of losing parties and those less satisfied with the economy tend to support checks and balances more. Opponents of governing parties are less likely to accept potential infringements on the independence of the judiciary. Improved economic performance leads to higher acceptance of judicial reform. Citizens' support for checks and balances is shown to be contingent and volatile.