期刊
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION
卷 190, 期 -, 页码 348-365出版社
ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2021.07.036
关键词
Inspection; Regulation; Compliance; Enforcement; Restaurant hygiene
类别
Periodic inspections with unannounced timing are effective in enforcing environmental, health, and safety regulations by preventing firms from anticipating and complying selectively. Research findings suggest that when multiple food-service establishments in a facility are inspected during the same visit, the first establishment inspected tends to perform significantly worse compared to the ones inspected later.
Periodic inspections, in which firms are punished for detected violations, are a popu-lar means of enforcing environmental, health, and safety regulations. The effectiveness of these programs typically hinges on inspection timing being unannounced and difficult to anticipate, lest firms comply only when they believe inspections are likely. In Las Vegas, Nevada, many facilities-e.g., casinos, hotels, and shopping malls-house multiple food-service establishments, several of which are often inspected during the same inspector visit. When this happens, all but the first establishment inspected likely anticipate their inspection to a meaningful extent. Using data which record inspection starting times and span more than six years, I find that establishments in such facilities perform significantly and substantially worse when they receive the first inspection of a visit. Relative to their own performances when inspected later than first, establishments are assessed 21% more inspection-score demerits and cited for 31% more critical violations in these surprise in-spections. (c) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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