The Generalized First- and Second-Price Auctions: Overbidding, Underbidding, and Optimal Reserve Price

The paper generalizes the models of the standard first- and second-price auctions (FPA and SPA) by using the Cobb-Douglas function to evaluate bidders' two conflicting bidding preferences for the probability of winning the item (C-pwin) and the profit conditional on winning (C-profit). Compared with the popular expected profit function, this function has the advantage of allowing the bidders to equally or differently value C-pwin and C-profit from the point of view of multiple criteria decision making, and then can capture bidders' bidding behavior in reality. Introduction of the Cobb-Douglas function into the FPA allows us to provide new interpretations for overbidding (underbidding) behavior and the dependence of the optimal reserve price on the number of bidders. Our new interpretations are all attributed to the bidders' different preferences for C-pwin and C-profit. In contrast, this introduction into the SPA does not matter. Our findings suggest that the seller should prefer the FPA (SPA) over the SPA (FPA) and set a lower (higher) optimal reserve price if he conjectures that the bidders have a stronger desire to win an auction (to obtain a profit). The above results help the seller to select between the two auctions and set a reserve price in practice.

Automated summary

This paper generalizes the models of the standard first- and second-price auctions by using the Cobb-Douglas function to evaluate bidders' bidding preferences. The findings suggest that bidders have different preferences for the probability of winning and the profit conditional on winning, which impact bidding behavior and the optimal reserve price.