Biobjective Robust Incentive Mechanism Design for Mobile Crowdsensing

In recent years, mobile crowdsensing has become an effective method for large-scale data collection. Incentive mechanism is fundamentally important for mobile crowdsensing systems. Many mobile crowdsensing systems expect to optimize multiple objectives simultaneously. Most of the existing works transform the multiobjective problem into a single objective problem through constraints or scalarization method. However, due to the uncertain importance (weights) of objectives and the instable quality of crowdsensed data, such transformation is usually unrealizable. In this article, we aim to optimize the worst performance of two objective functions in mobile crowdsensing in order to improve the system robustness. We model an auction-based biobjective robust mobile crowdsensing system, and design two independent objective functions to maximize the expected profit and coverage, respectively. We formulate the robust user selection (RUS) problem, and design an incentive mechanism, which utilizes the combination of binary search and greedy algorithm, to solve the RUS problem. Through both rigorous theoretical analysis and extensive simulations, we demonstrate that the designed incentive mechanisms satisfy desirable properties of computational efficiency, individual rationality, truthfulness, and constant approximation to the tightened RUS problem. Moreover, the proposed incentive mechanism can be easily extended to multiobjective robust mobile crowdsensing systems, and all desirable properties still hold. The simulation results reveal that our incentive mechanism achieves 11% improvement of the platform's utility, compared with the greedy algorithm for biobjective mobile crowdsensing systems on average.

Automated summary

Mobile crowdsensing is an effective method for large-scale data collection, and incentive mechanisms are crucial for its success. This article proposes an auction-based biobjective robust mobile crowdsensing system with an incentive mechanism that achieves desirable properties such as computational efficiency and individual rationality. The proposed mechanism also shows improvement in platform utility compared to existing algorithms.