期刊
ACS SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY
卷 11, 期 2, 页码 522-527出版社
AMER CHEMICAL SOC
DOI: 10.1021/acssynbio.1c00324
关键词
biosecurity; biosafety; SARS-CoV-2; synthetic biology; engineering biology
资金
- Department of Homeland Security [19STFRG00011-01-00]
- National Science Foundation (NSF) [1818248]
- National Science Foundation [MCB-1714352, MCB-2001743, 1807461, 1935372, EF-1935120, DBI-1934573]
- Welch Foundation [F-1654]
- Schmidt Futures Ethics in the Lab grant
- U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, Bioenergy Technologies Office [DE-AC02-05CH11231]
- U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Science [DE-AC02-05CH11231]
- DOE [2011882]
- Nuclear Threat Initiative
- Direct For Biological Sciences
- Emerging Frontiers [1935372] Funding Source: National Science Foundation
- Division of Computing and Communication Foundations
- Direct For Computer & Info Scie & Enginr [1807461] Funding Source: National Science Foundation
- Div Of Molecular and Cellular Bioscience
- Direct For Biological Sciences [1818248] Funding Source: National Science Foundation
The rapid development of synthetic biology technologies has led to breakthrough applications with far-reaching implications, particularly in the development of diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines for COVID-19. However, there are risks associated with the publication of synthetic biology research and techniques, especially when it comes to the safety and distribution of pathogenic viruses. It is recommended to implement mandatory safety and security reviews for the de novo synthesis of certain pathogenic viruses and to include discussions or review processes regarding security considerations in the published papers, in order to enhance security and minimize negative outcomes.
The ability to construct, synthesize, and edit genes and genomes at scale and with speed enables, in synergy with other tools of engineering biology, breakthrough applications with far-reaching implications for society. As SARS-CoV-2 spread around the world in early spring of 2020, researchers rapidly mobilized, using these tools in the development of diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines for COVID-19. The sharing of knowledge was crucial to making rapid progress. Several publications described the use of reverse genetics for the de novo construction of SARS-CoV-2 in the laboratory, one in the form of a protocol. Given the demonstrable harm caused by the virus, the unequal distribution of mitigating vaccines and therapeutics, their unknown efficacy against variants, and the interest in this research by laboratories unaccustomed to working with highly transmissible pandemic pathogens, there are risks associated with such publications, particularly as protocols. We describe considerations and offer suggestions for enhancing security in the publication of synthetic biology research and techniques. We recommend: (1) that protocol manuscripts for the de novo synthesis of certain pathogenic viruses undergo a mandatory safety and security review; (2) that if published, such papers include descriptions of the discussions or review processes that occurred regarding security considerations in the main text; and (3) the development of a governance framework for the inclusion of basic security screening during the publication process of engineering biology/synthetic biology manuscripts to build and support a safe and secure research enterprise that is able to maximize its positive impacts and minimize any negative outcomes.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据