4.7 Article

Auction-Based VM Allocation for Deadline-Sensitive Tasks in Distributed Edge Cloud

期刊

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SERVICES COMPUTING
卷 14, 期 6, 页码 1702-1716

出版社

IEEE COMPUTER SOC
DOI: 10.1109/TSC.2019.2902549

关键词

Auction mechanism; edge cloud; mobile cloud computing; virtual machine allocation

资金

  1. National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) [61872330, 61572457, 61379132, U1709217, 61303206, 61572342, 61502261]
  2. NSF [CNS 1757533, CNS 1629746, CNS 1564128, CNS 1449860, CNS 1461932, CNS 1460971, IIP 1439672]
  3. NSF of Jiangsu Province in China [BK20131174, BK2009150]
  4. Anhui Initiative in Quantum Information Technologies [AHY150300]
  5. China Scholarship Council (CSC) [201806340014]

向作者/读者索取更多资源

This paper investigates the problem of allocating VM resources to mobile users in geo-distributed ECNs using auction theory, proposing the AVA mechanism. A greedy approximation algorithm is designed to determine the winners, and it is shown that the AVA mechanism achieves an approximately optimal solution while possessing properties of truthfulness, individual rationality, and computational efficiency. Extensive simulations on real traces demonstrate the significant performance of the proposed AVA mechanism.
Edge cloud computing is a new paradigm in which the computation and storage services of remote cloud data centers are moved to Edge Cloud Nodes (ECNs) in network edges. Compared to traditional cloud data centers, ECNs are geographically close to mobile users so the communication latency is significantly reduced. In this paper, we study the problem of allocating Virtual Machine (VM) resources in geo-distributed ECNs to mobile users by using the auction theory. First, we treat mobile users and ECNs as the buyers and sellers of the VM resource auction, respectively. Then, we model the VM resource allocation problem as an n-to-one weighted bipartite graph matching problem with 0-1 knapsack constraints. Since this problem is NP-hard, we design a greedy approximation algorithm to determine the winners of the auction, based on which we propose a truthful Auction-based VM resource Allocation (AVA) mechanism to solve the problem. Moreover, we prove that the AVA mechanism not only achieves an approximately optimal solution for winner selection, but also has the properties of truthfulness, individual rationality, and computational efficiency. Finally, we conduct extensive simulations on real traces to verify the significant performances of the proposed AVA mechanism.

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