期刊
SYNTHESE
卷 199, 期 5-6, 页码 14975-14991出版社
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-021-03451-7
关键词
Belief; Reasoning disposition; Philosophy of mind
资金
- Projekt DEAL
Believing in something does not necessarily mean using it as a premise in reasoning.
Are there any dispositions one must have if one believes p? A widespread answer emphasizes the role of beliefs in reasoning and holds that if one believes p, one must be disposed to treat p as true (rely on p/use p as a premise) in one's reasoning. I argue that this answer is subject to counterexamples.
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