Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in multi-game populations

This paper introduces a multi-game population to describe the fact that people have heterogeneous perceptions on their interactions. Besides, we also consider the diversity of perceptions among all agents in a structured population. Then, we established the theoretical model to investigate the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in a spatial multi-game population. By means of the Monte Carlo method, we get some insightful observations regarding to the promotion of cooperation. Firstly, simulation results show that agents are more likely to take cooperation action in a multi-game population than in a homogeneous population. Moreover, we also find out that agents playing prisoner's dilemma game are possible to adopt cooperation strategy when they interact with agents playing snowdrift game. (C) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Automated summary

This paper introduces a multi-game population to investigate the evolutionary dynamics of cooperation. The findings suggest that agents are more likely to cooperate in a multi-game population, and that agents playing different games may adopt cooperation strategies when interacting with each other.