Evolutionary Game Model of Group Choice Dilemmas on Hypergraphs

We introduce an evolutionary game on hypergraphs in which decisions between a risky alternative and a safe one are taken in social groups of different sizes. The model naturally reproduces choice shifts, namely the differences between the preference of individual decision makers and the consensual choice of a group, that have been empirically observed in choice dilemmas. In particular, a deviation from the Nash equilibrium toward the risky strategy occurs when the dynamics takes place on heterogeneous hypergraphs. These results can explain the emergence of irrational herding and radical behaviors in social groups.

Automated summary

The evolutionary game on hypergraphs demonstrates the differences between individual preferences and group consensus in decision-making in social groups of different sizes. Specifically, deviations from Nash equilibrium towards risky strategies occur when dynamics take place on heterogeneous hypergraphs, potentially explaining the emergence of irrational herding and radical behaviors in social groups.