Distributed and individualized computation offloading optimization in a fog computing environment

In a newly emerged fog computing environment, various user equipments (UE) enhance their computing power and extend their battery lifetime by computation offloading to mobile edge cloud (MEC) servers. Such an environment is distributed and competitive in nature. In this paper, we take a game theoretical approach to computation offloading optimization in a fog computing environment. Such an approach captures and characterizes the nature of a competitive environment. The main contributions of the paper can be summarized as follows. First, we formulate a non-cooperative game with both UEs and MECs as players. Each UE attempts to minimize the execution time of its tasks with an energy constraint. Each MEC attempts to minimize the product of its power consumption for computation and execution time for allocated tasks. Second, we develop a heuristic algorithm for a UE to determine its heuristically best response to the current situation, an algorithm for an MEC to determine its best response to the current situation, and an iterative algorithm to find the Nash equilibrium. Third, we prove that our iterative algorithm converges to a Nash equilibrium. We demonstrate numerical examples of our non-cooperative games with and without MECs' participation. We observe that our iterative algorithm always quickly converges to a Nash equilibrium. The uniqueness of our non-cooperative games is that the strategy set of a player can be discrete and the payoff function of a player can be obtained by a heuristic algorithm for combinatorial optimization. To the best of the author's knowledge, there has been no such investigation of non-cooperative games based on combinatorial optimization for computation offloading optimization in a fog computing environment. (C) 2021 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Automated summary

This paper explores computation offloading optimization in a competitive fog computing environment using game theory. The main contributions include formulating a non-cooperative game with players as UEs and MECs, developing heuristic algorithms for determining best responses, and proving convergence to a Nash equilibrium. Numerical examples demonstrate quick convergence to equilibrium, with a unique strategy set and payoff function based on combinatorial optimization.