期刊
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS II-EXPRESS BRIEFS
卷 69, 期 1, 页码 149-153出版社
IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
DOI: 10.1109/TCSII.2021.3073724
关键词
Robot sensing systems; Detectors; System performance; Kalman filters; Closed loop systems; Q measurement; Denial-of-service attack; Networked control systems (NCSs); false data injection attacks; partial attacks; stealthiness; stability
资金
- National Natural Science Foundation of China [61673023, 61773144]
- Youth Talent Support Program of Beijing Municipality
- NCUT Yujie Talent Training Program
- BMEC Basic Scientific Research Foundation
- National Key Research and Development Program of China [2018YFC1602703]
This paper addresses the issue of false data injection (FDI) attacks on partial sensor measurements of a networked stochastic system. A partial FDI attack strategy is presented, which injects false signals into the feedback communication channel to disrupt the performance of a Kalman filter based output tracking control system. The paper derives the stealthiness condition of the attack and its impact on the closed-loop system, which differs from existing work on FDI attacks against all sensor measurements. The research contributes to ensuring secure control of networked systems by protecting critical sensor measurements from FDI attacks.
This brief concerns the problem of false data injection (FDI) attacks against partial sensor measurements of a networked stochastic system. For a Kalman filter based output tracking control system with a residual-based anomaly detector, a partial FDI attack strategy is presented to deteriorate the system performance by injecting false signals into the feedback communication channel to tamper partial sensor measurements. The stealthiness condition of the attack as well as its impact on the closed-loop system is derived, which are quite different from those of the FDI attack against all sensor measurements given in the existing work. This may be helpful for guaranteeing the secure control of a networked system by protecting partial critical sensor measurements from FDI attacks. Two numerical examples are included to verify the theoretical results.
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