4.7 Article

A game-theoretic joint optimal pricing and resource allocation for Mobile Edge Computing in NOMA-based 5G networks and beyond

期刊

COMPUTER NETWORKS
卷 198, 期 -, 页码 -

出版社

ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.comnet.2021.108352

关键词

Mobile Edge Computing; Offloading; Pricing; Resource allocation; Game theory

向作者/读者索取更多资源

Mobile Edge Computing offers cloud computation capabilities at the edge of the mobile network, but efficiency is influenced by purchasing power and resource competition. A game-based distributed scheme is proposed to address challenges in resource allocation and pricing for computation offloading, considering incentives and conflicts between edge providers and Mobile Users (MUs).
Mobile Edge Computing is a new computing paradigm that offers cloud computation capabilities at the edge of the mobile network. Due to the proximity to Mobile Users (MUs), the edge cloud can be accessed with low latency by resource-limited mobile devices with the aim of extending their capabilities through computation offloading. Despite its unique features, the efficiency of offloading is highly influenced by the purchasing power of MUs as well as the competition arisen to access both limited communication and computation resources. However, since the MUs' demands for these resources change dynamically, the pricing approaches should be capable of adapting in real-world scenarios. To address the aforementioned challenges, we propose a game-based distributed scheme to jointly and dynamically allocate and price resources required for proper offloading in a two-tier NOMA-based mobile system. To this end, we consider the incentives of both the edge provider and MUs as well as conflicts arising from their interactions. Under the proposed scheme, MUs should pay not only based on the given resources but also based on their transmission power level as a punishment for their produced interference. We formulate the interactions among the monopolist edge provider and MUs using the Stackelberg game. Further, the power allocation in NOMA and the competition of MUs over computation resources are modeled using game theory and shown admitting the potential and the weakly coupled constraint game, respectively. Furthermore, we prove the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium of both corresponding games and calculate it for both the edge provider and MUs. Simulation results demonstrate the efficiency of the proposed approach in terms of the utility of MUs and the edge provider, average allocated communication and computation resources, optimal pricing, and the number of rejected MUs under different purchasing power.

作者

我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。

评论

主要评分

4.7
评分不足

次要评分

新颖性
-
重要性
-
科学严谨性
-
评价这篇论文

推荐

暂无数据
暂无数据