4.7 Article

The role of alliance cooperation in spatial public goods game

期刊

CHAOS SOLITONS & FRACTALS
卷 152, 期 -, 页码 -

出版社

PERGAMON-ELSEVIER SCIENCE LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.chaos.2021.111395

关键词

Evolutionary game; Network reciprocity; Public goods game; Alliance; Cooperation

资金

  1. National Natural Science Foundation of China [61663046, 61876166]
  2. Open Foundation of Key Laboratory of Software Engineering of Yunnan Province [2020SE308, 2020SE309]
  3. Scientific Research Foundation of Education Department of Yunnan Province [2021J0007]

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The research discusses the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games with alliance strategy on a square lattice network. Alliance players demonstrate the ability to clear out defectors by providing aid to their exploited allies. However, the level of cooperation is influenced by the intensity of aid and synergy factor.
Assistance and aiding partners exploited by defectors could be essential to avoid being exploited and ex-panding the payoff. The research on of human behaviors has suggested that organizations and alliances play an important role in promoting cooperation between humans. Therefore, this article studies the evolution of cooperation in spatial public goods games with alliance strategy on square lattice network where, in addition to the classical strategies of cooperation (C) and defection (D), alliance cooperators (A) are considered as an additional strategy. Alliance players will provide a portion of their payoff to aid their allies in the same group, who have been exploited by defectors. Apparently, alliance players demonstrate a remarkable ability sweep out defectors through network reciprocity. However, by analyzing the param-eters, as influenced by cooperators, the cooperation level is a non-monotonic function of aid intensity and synergy factor. The results presented in this article can help to understand the role of alliance strategies, organizations, and taxes in promoting and maintaining cooperation in human society. (c) 2021 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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