期刊
GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION
卷 57, 期 3, 页码 508-531出版社
CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS
DOI: 10.1017/gov.2021.12
关键词
mayoral elections; democratic backsliding; dominant parties; Poland; Hungary
The study reveals that in local politics, mayoral elections using two-round system and strategic coordination among opposition parties may hinder the consolidation of dominant-party regime, while increasing the number of candidates can help decrease the chances of the dominant party winning in the first round.
Aspiring dominant-party regimes often institute major institutional and political reforms at the national level to ensure they retain control. However, subnational politics is an important, under-studied, component of regime consolidation. This study uses mayoral races in Hungary and Poland from 2006 to 2018 to examine two factors that may inhibit dominant-party regime consolidation in local politics: the use of two-round, i.e. runoff, electoral systems and strategic coordination among opposition parties. While we find little evidence that strategic coordination can lead to widespread opposition success in single-round systems, we do find that increasing the number of candidates decreases the likelihood of the nationally dominant party winning in the first round while not affecting the second round. As such, two-round mayoral elections may be an important buffer to dominant-party regime consolidation and may provide a training ground for the future opposition.
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