Network embeddedness in illegal online markets: endogenous sources of prices and profit in anonymous criminal drug trade

Although economic sociology emphasizes the role of social networks for shaping economic action, little research has examined how network governance structures affect prices in the unregulated and high-risk social context of online criminal trade. We consider how overembeddedness-a state of excessive interconnectedness among market actors-arises from endogenous trade relations to shape prices in illegal online markets with aggregate consequences for short-term gross illegal revenue. Drawing on transaction-level data on 16 847 illegal drug transactions over 14 months of trade in a 'darknet' drug market, we assess how repeated exchanges and closure in buyer-vendor trade networks nonlinearly influence prices and short-term gross revenue from illegal drug trade. Using a series of panel models, we find that increases in closure and repeated exchange raise prices until a threshold is reached upon which prices and gross monthly revenue begin to decline as networks become overembedded. Findings provide insight into the network determinants of prices and gross monthly revenue in illegal online drug trade and illustrate how network structure shapes prices in criminal markets, even in anonymous trade environments.

Automated summary

This study examines how network governance structures affect prices in the social context of online criminal trade. The findings suggest that overembeddedness in the buyer-vendor trade networks can lead to an increase in prices until a threshold is reached, after which prices and gross revenue decline. These results provide insights into how network structure shapes prices in criminal markets, even in anonymous trade environments.