4.4 Article

Media coverage and investment efficiency

期刊

JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL FINANCE
卷 63, 期 -, 页码 270-293

出版社

ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.jempfin.2021.07.002

关键词

Media coverage; Investment efficiency; Information asymmetry; Corporate governance; CEO overconfidence

资金

  1. National Natural Science Foundation of China [71873058]

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The study reveals that media coverage affects firm-level investment efficiency by reducing under-investment and increasing over-investment. Media-induced CEO overconfidence drives the positive effect of media coverage on over-investment. Additionally, the impact of news coverage on investment efficiency is mainly through the dissemination of information rather than its creation.
We examine the effect of media coverage on firm-level investment efficiency. We find that media coverage reduces under-investment but increases over-investment. The negative effect of media coverage on under-investment is more pronounced in firms affected by greater information asymmetry and poorer corporate governance. The positive effect of media coverage on over-investment is driven by media-induced CEO overconfidence. Additional results show that both investment- and non-investment-related news coverage decrease under-investment, while non-investment-related news coverage is more influential in increasing over-investment. In general, higher news optimism is associated with less under-investment but more over-investment. Moreover, media coverage affects investment efficiency through its information dissemination rather than information creation function. Collectively, our results suggest that firms' media visibility promotes more over-investment than under-investment.

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