Access to Justice in Clientelist Networks

Despite its importance for poverty reduction, the poor face barriers when accessing justice. However, the literature, looking mostly at developed countries, focuses on the institutional underpinnings of these restrictions, and thus ignores social structural barriers. This paper deals with one type of social barrier; clientelism and its impact on poor clients' access to justice. I argue that asymmetric power distribution enables patrons to bar clients from accessing formal institutions. Such barriers can't be rectified through institutional reforms. Making use of an original dataset from Pakistan this paper recommends an unorthodox policy solution; increasing connectivity. I demonstrate how exit options, brought about through connectivity, alter bargaining powers, thereby limiting patrons' ability to block clients from accessing formal justice institutions.

Automated summary

Despite its importance for poverty reduction, accessing justice poses barriers for the poor. Most literature focuses on institutional restrictions in developed countries and disregards social structural barriers. This paper explores one social barrier, clientelism, and its impact on the poor's access to justice. It argues that asymmetric power distribution allows patrons to block clients from formal institutions, which cannot be rectified through institutional reforms. The paper suggests an unorthodox policy solution of increasing connectivity, supported by an original dataset from Pakistan, to enhance bargaining power and overcome these barriers.