期刊
LONG RANGE PLANNING
卷 55, 期 3, 页码 -出版社
ELSEVIER SCI LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.lrp.2021.102130
关键词
Leadership succession; Strategic change; Agency problem; Corporate governance
When a successor CEO is hired from outside the firm and the former CEO stays on board as chair, companies with a higher proportion of outside directors experience greater strategic change post-succession, while no effect is found in other succession scenarios.
Firms often retain their former CEOs on the board after succession to benefit from the former CEOs' firm-specific expertise. However, their presence can inhibit successor CEOs from implementing meaningful strategic change, as the former CEOs seek to preserve their personal legacy and may see the strategic landscape differently, especially when the successor CEO is hired from outside the firm. Using a strategic leadership interface perspective, we propose that board members can alleviate this potential tension and enable strategic change. To test our theory, we focus on a subsample of succession events: when the former CEO stays on board as chair and the successor CEO is an outsider. This scenario is likely to result in strategic tension and cognitive differences between these two organizational leaders. We find that in such situations, boards with a higher proportion of outside directors experience greater post-succession strategic change; we find no effect in other succession scenarios. We isolate legacy conservation as a motivating factor by showing that the effect manifests for divestitures but not for acquisitions.
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