Evolutionary Games and Dynamics in Public Goods Supply with Repetitive Actions

Based on a tripartite game model among suppliers of public goods, consumers, and the government, a tripartite repeated game model is constructed to analyze the evolution mechanism of which suppliers supply at low prices, consumers purchase, and the government provides incentives, and to establish the dynamics system of a repeated game. The equilibrium points of the evolutionary game are solved, and among them, the equilibrium points are found to satisfy the parameter conditions of ESS. The numerical simulation is employed to verify the impact of penalty coefficients and discount factors on the stability of strategies, which are adopted by the three players in a tripartite repeated game on public goods, and scenario analyses are conducted. The research results of this paper could provide a reference for the government, suppliers, and consumers to make rapid decisions, who are in the supply chain of public goods, especially quasi-public goods, such as coal, water, electricity, and gas, and help them to obtain stable incomes and then ensure the stable operation of the market.

Automated summary

This study constructs a tripartite repeated game model to analyze the evolution mechanism of suppliers, consumers, and government in the public goods market. It finds stable equilibrium points and verifies the impact of penalty coefficients and discount factors on strategy stability through numerical simulation. The research results provide a reference for decision-making by government, suppliers, and consumers in the public goods supply chain.