期刊
SYNTHESE
卷 199, 期 3-4, 页码 8943-8964出版社
SPRINGER
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-021-03189-2
关键词
Representationalism; Dispositionalism; Belief; Degrees of belief; Fodor; Dispositional representationalism
This paper argues that a Fodorian variety of representationalism can explain the fact that beliefs come in degrees, and proposes a new theory called dispositional representationalism, which involves direct appeal to our dispositions to form representations and propositional attitudes concerning them.
This paper argues that representationalism of a Fodorian variety can accommodate the fact that beliefs come in degrees. First, it responds to two key arguments to the contrary. Second, it builds upon these responses and outlines a novel representationalist theory of degrees of beliefs. I call this theory dispositional representationalism, as it involves direct appeal to our dispositions to form representations and propositional attitudes concerning them.
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