期刊
SCIENCE OF THE TOTAL ENVIRONMENT
卷 771, 期 -, 页码 -出版社
ELSEVIER
DOI: 10.1016/j.scitotenv.2021.145400
关键词
Facilitated Industrial Symbiosis; Game Theory; Industrial park; Synergy; Utility function; Waste exchange
资金
- Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities [DPI2017-88127-R]
Industrial Symbiosis (IS) offers an opportunity for resource exchange, but overcoming barriers such as mistrust and lack of information is necessary for implementation. This research proposed combining Facilitated Industrial Symbiosis (FIS) and Game Theory (GT) to facilitate waste exchanges and maximize benefits. The study tested this approach in a hypothetical industrial park, emphasizing the key role of facilitators and GT in fostering company participation and optimizing benefits.
Industrial Symbiosis (IS) provides an opportunity to foster resource exchange, whereby the wastes of some companies are used as the feed to others. However, putting IS into practice requires overcoming a series of obstacles such as mistrust and lack of information. In this context, this research proposed the coupling of Facilitated Industrial Symbiosis (FIS) and Game Theory (GT) to break down these barriers. On the one hand, the consideration of FIS entailed the incorporation of the figure of the facilitator into the IS process throughout six different steps, thereby improving the confidence between companies and their access to information about potential synergies. On the other hand, GT was implemented through utility functions that served to favor the achievement of agreements, since their application supported the identification of collective solutions optimizing the benefits of all the parties. The proposed approach was tested through a hypothetical industrial park involving ten companies with different interests and magnitudes. The stepwise examination of the results achieved in this case study emphasized the key role played by the facilitator and GT to foster the participation of companies in waste exchanges and maximize their benefits, respectively. (C) 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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