期刊
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PRODUCTION RESEARCH
卷 60, 期 18, 页码 5571-5594出版社
TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
DOI: 10.1080/00207543.2021.1966541
关键词
Supply chain modelling; government subsidy; asymmetric information; bioenergy; game theory
资金
- National Natural Science Foundation of China [71772070]
- Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities [N2006006]
- Project of Promoting Talents in Liaoning Province [XLYC1807252]
- Major Program of National Natural Science Foundation of China [71790614]
- 111 Project [B16009]
This paper investigates government subsidy programmes for a bioenergy supply chain composed of a power plant and farmers who possess quality information of bioenergy. The government offers two types of subsidy programmes, AQC and PLC, to increase bioenergy supply. The study finds that in equilibrium, the government prefers the AQC programme under certain conditions, but social welfare may be higher with the PLC programme in other scenarios.
This paper investigates the government subsidy programmes for a bioenergy supply chain composed of a power plant and farmers who privately know their quality information of bioenergy. The government offers two types of subsidy programmes to increase the supply of bioenergy: Agriculture Quantity Coverage (AQC) programme that pays the farmers subsidies based on the quantity of bioenergy, and Price Loss Coverage (PLC) programme that is triggered when the market price of bioenergy falls below a reference price. With AQC programme, when the quantity of bioenergy is large, farmers may get more subsidies but the wholesale price of bioenergy would decrease, thus hurting the farmers' payoffs. By contrast, with PLC programme, the farmers can get more subsidies with a lower wholesale price, which also undermines the farmers' profitability. In equilibrium, the government prefers the AQC programme when the cost of the non-bioenergy is high, or the cost of the non-bioenergy is low and the government's subsidy payment coefficient in the PLC programme is high. Moreover, social welfare is higher with the PLC programme than that with the AQC programme when the cost of the non-bioenergy is high and the subsidy payment coefficient is low, and is lower otherwise.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据