4.8 Article

Incentive-Based Coded Distributed Computing Management for Latency Reduction in IoT Services-A Game Theoretic Approach

期刊

IEEE INTERNET OF THINGS JOURNAL
卷 8, 期 10, 页码 8259-8278

出版社

IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
DOI: 10.1109/JIOT.2020.3045277

关键词

Distributed computing; Encoding; Task analysis; Internet of Things; Games; Resource management; Distributed databases; Coded distributed computing (DC); incentive mechanism; load management; Stackelberg game

资金

  1. Basic Science Research Program through the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) - Ministry of Education [2019R1A6A3A13097142]
  2. Institute of Information and Communications Technology Planning and Evaluation grant - Korea Government (MSIT) [2020-0-00833]
  3. National Research Foundation of Korea [2019R1A6A3A13097142] Funding Source: Korea Institute of Science & Technology Information (KISTI), National Science & Technology Information Service (NTIS)

向作者/读者索取更多资源

This article proposes novel coded distributed computing mechanisms on heterogeneous mobile devices to reduce latency in Internet-of-Things services. Through analyzing a Stackelberg game between task publishers and mobile devices, it achieves significant latency reduction and social welfare improvement compared to benchmark mechanisms. The proposed algorithms effectively balance computing speed, energy consumption, and workload allocation in a strategic decision-making structure.
This article studies distributed computing (DC) mechanisms on heterogeneous mobile devices (MDs) for latency reduction (LR) in Internet-of-Things (IoT) services by mitigating the effect of straggling MDs. We propose novel coded DC mechanisms with two different incentive distributions that consider the time-discounting value of processed results and the amount of the workload computed by MDs. Specifically, we consider distributed gradient descent computing with coding when a task publisher (TP) with a limited amount of budget offers incentives to encourage MDs' participation in the computation. To analyze a hierarchical decision-making structure of the TP and MDs, we formulate a strategic competition between them as a Stackelberg game. In the case that the MDs are the leaders, we design a CPU-cycle frequency control scheme to balance each MD's computing speed and energy consumption for obtaining its maximum utility with the incentive mechanisms. As the follower, the TP aims at minimizing latency of the DC, and it follows the MDs' decisions to determine the load allocation for each MD. Then, we design an algorithm achieving the Stackelberg equilibrium, which is shown to be a unique Nash equilibrium of the game. The performance evaluation results show that the proposed mechanisms achieve 39% of LR on average compared to the benchmark mechanism. Furthermore, the results corroborate the efficiency of the proposed mechanisms in terms of the MDs' social welfare.

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