Why the backfire effect does not explain the durability of political misperceptions

Previous research indicated that corrective information can some-times provoke a so-called ?backfire effect? in which respondents more strongly endorsed a misperception about a controversial political or scientific issue when their beliefs or predispositions were challenged. I show how subsequent research and media coverage seized on this finding, distorting its generality and exag-gerating its role relative to other factors in explaining the dura-bility of political misperceptions. To the contrary, an emerging research consensus finds that corrective information is typically at least somewhat effective at increasing belief accuracy when received by respondents. However, the research that I review suggests that the accuracy-increasing effects of corrective infor-mation like fact checks often do not last or accumulate; instead, they frequently seem to decay or be overwhelmed by cues from elites and the media promoting more congenial but less accu-rate claims. As a result, misperceptions typically persist in public opinion for years after they have been debunked. Given these realities, the primary challenge for scientific communication is not to prevent backfire effects but instead, to understand how to tar-get corrective information better and to make it more effective. Ultimately, however, the best approach is to disrupt the forma-tion of linkages between group identities and false claims and to reduce the flow of cues reinforcing those claims from elites and the media. Doing so will require a shift from a strategy focused on providing information to the public to one that consid-ers the roles of intermediaries in forming and maintaining belief systems.

Automated summary

Research shows that corrective information is generally effective at increasing belief accuracy, but its effects often decay or are overwhelmed by cues from elites and the media. To address persistent misperceptions, disrupting the linkages between group identities and false claims, and reducing the flow of cues from elites and the media, is crucial. Shifting the focus from providing information to the public to considering the roles of intermediaries in forming and maintaining belief systems is essential for effective scientific communication.