期刊
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF OPERATIONAL RESEARCH
卷 249, 期 3, 页码 1131-1138出版社
ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2015.09.025
关键词
Dynamic games; Oligopoly; Environmental externality; R&D
资金
- Austrian Science Fund (FWF) [P 25275] Funding Source: researchfish
We extend a well-known differential oligopoly game to encompass the possibility for production to generate a negative environmental externality, regulated through Pigouvian taxation and price caps. We show that, if the price cap is set so as to fix the tolerable maximum amount of emissions, the resulting equilibrium investment in green R&D is indeed concave in the structure of the industry. Our analysis appears to indicate that inverted-U-shaped investment curves are generated by regulatory measures instead of being a 'natural' feature of firms' decisions. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. and Association of European Operational Research Societies (EURO) within the International Federation of Operational Research Societies (IFORS). All rights reserved.
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