期刊
JOURNAL OF THE OPERATIONAL RESEARCH SOCIETY
卷 73, 期 6, 页码 1379-1392出版社
TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
DOI: 10.1080/01605682.2021.1907240
关键词
Healthcare management; revenue sharing; signaling; information asymmetry
资金
- MOST in Taiwan [106-2410-H-002-050-MY2]
This paper examines the contracting problem between a medical equipment vendor and a hospital in the healthcare industry. The study shows how vendors can use revenue sharing as a signaling device of reliability to prevent hospitals from underpaying for reliable equipment. Furthermore, vendors are better able to signal their reliability through revenue sharing to non-profit hospitals than to for-profit hospitals.
This paper examines the contracting problem between a medical equipment vendor and a hospital in the healthcare industry. Many medical treatments depend heavily on the reliability of newly developed equipment, which typically encompasses private information on the part of the vendor. We built a game-theoretic model to examine the optimal contract a vendor can offer to prevent hospitals from underpaying for a reliable machine. First, the contract format including revenue sharing may serve as a signaling device of reliability. Second, the management model of a hospital has a strong impact on contract design. In particular, the vendor is better able to signal its reliability through revenue sharing to a non-profit hospital than to a for-profit hospital. Lastly, revenue sharing becomes more attractive to vendors as hospitals are more concerned about social welfare.
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