Optimal DoS Attack Against LQR Control Channels

This brief investigates the problem of denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against linear quadratic regulator (LQR) control channels. Owing to energy constraints, the attacker can only launch consecutive DoS attacks with a certain length m to block communication channels between the controller and actuator. We consider two compensation strategies commonly found in the literature, namely, zero-input and hold-input when control packets are blocked. It is shown that jamming from the initial instant is not always optimal for attackers. Necessary and sufficient conditions are given to ensure the optimality of blocking from the initial instant despite the randomness of initial states. In the case where attackers know the initial state, a finite-interval search method is given to obtain the optimal starting instant of DoS attacks. Numerical examples illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed methods.

Automated summary

This study investigates DoS attacks against LQR control channels, analyzing two common compensation strategies and providing optimal conditions for blocking from the initial instant, as well as a method to obtain the optimal starting time. Numerical examples demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed methods.