The role of pairwise nonlinear evolutionary dynamics in the rock-paper-scissors game with noise

The difference between conventional replicator dynamics and pairwise (PW) nonlinear Fermi dynamics can be discerned by studying the evolutionary dynamics of the interactions between the symmetric cyclic structure in the rock-paper-scissors game and interand intraspecific competitions. Often, conventional replicator models presume that the payoff difference among species is a linear function (a linear benefit). This study introduces a PW contrast under the properties of the well-known Fermi rule, where species play against one another in pairs. To model a PW nonlinear evolutionary environment (a nonlinear benefit) within this framework, both analytical and numerical approaches are applied. It is determined that the dynamics of the linear and nonlinear benefits can present the same stability conditions at equilibrium. Moreover, it is also demonstrated that, even in an identical equilibrium condition for both dynamics, the numerical result run by a deterministic approach presents a faster stability state for nonlinear benefit dynamics. This study also suggests that introducing mutation as demographic noise can effectively disrupt the phase regions and show the different relationships between linear and nonlinear dynamics. The symmetric bidirectional mutation among all the species reduced to the stable limit cycle by an arbitrary small mutation rate is also explored. Due to the environmental noise, however, linear and nonlinear exhibit the same steady state. Nevertheless, non-linearity illustrates more stable and faster stability situations. Our result suggests that environmental and demographic noise on the evolutionary dynamic framework can serve as a mechanism for supporting PW nonlinear dynamics in multi-species games. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Automated summary

This study compares the difference between conventional replicator dynamics and pairwise nonlinear Fermi dynamics by studying the evolutionary dynamics of interactions in the rock-paper-scissors game. The research shows that linear and nonlinear benefits can have the same stability conditions at equilibrium, but nonlinear dynamics exhibit more stable and faster stability situations. Mutations as demographic noise can disrupt phase regions and demonstrate different relationships between linear and nonlinear dynamics.