Human Germline Genome Editing: On the Nature of Our Reasons to Genome Edit

Ever since the publication of Derek Parfit's Reasons and Persons, bioethicists have tended to distinguish between two different ways in which reproductive technologies may have implications for the welfare of future persons. Some interventions harm or benefit particular individuals: they are person affecting. Other interventions determine which individual, of a number of possible individuals, comes into existence: they are identity affecting and raise the famous non-identity problem. For the past several decades, bioethical debate has, for the most part, proceeded on the assumption that direct genetic modification of human embryos would be person affecting. In this paper, I argue that that genome editing is highly unlikely to be person affecting for the foreseeable future and, as a result, will neither benefit nor harm edited individuals.

Automated summary

Bioethicists have typically categorized reproductive technologies based on their potential implications for the welfare of future individuals, distinguishing between person-affecting interventions and identity-affecting interventions. While bioethical debates have largely assumed that direct genetic modification of human embryos would be person affecting, the author argues that genome editing is unlikely to have such effects for the foreseeable future. This implies that edited individuals may neither benefit nor be harmed by such interventions.