Ethical Mooreanism

In this paper I lay out, argue for, and defend ethical Mooreanism. In essence, the view says that some moral propositions are Moorean propositions and thus are epistemically superior to the conjunctions of the premises of skeptical arguments to the contrary. In Sect. 1 I explain Mooreanism and then ethical Mooreanism. In Sect. 2 I argue for ethical Mooreanism by noting a number of important epistemic parities that hold between certain moral truths and standard Moorean facts. In Sect. 3 I defend ethical Mooreanism against the objection that moral propositions are too epistemically dissimilar to standard Moorean facts to count as Moorean truths.

Automated summary

The paper presents and defends ethical Mooreanism, arguing that some moral propositions are Moorean propositions and thus have superior epistemic status. By highlighting the epistemic parallels between certain moral truths and standard Moorean facts, the author supports ethical Mooreanism and counters objections that question its validity.