期刊
ECONOMETRICA
卷 84, 期 5, 页码 1839-1880出版社
WILEY-BLACKWELL
DOI: 10.3982/ECTA13337
关键词
Probabilistic social choice; maximal lotteries; population-consistency; composition-consistency
类别
资金
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft [BR 2312/7-2, BR 2312/10-1]
Two fundamental axioms in social choice theory are consistency with respect to a variable electorate and consistency with respect to components of similar alternatives. In the context of traditional non-probabilistic social choice, these axioms are incompatible with each other. We show that in the context of probabilistic social choice, these axioms uniquely characterize a function proposed by Fishburn (1984). Fishburn's function returns so-called maximal lotteries, that is, lotteries that correspond to optimal mixed strategies in the symmetric zero-sum game induced by the pairwise majority margins. Maximal lotteries are guaranteed to exist due to von Neumann's Minimax Theorem, are almost always unique, and can be efficiently computed using linear programming.
作者
我是这篇论文的作者
点击您的名字以认领此论文并将其添加到您的个人资料中。
推荐
暂无数据