期刊
PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY B-BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES
卷 376, 期 1817, 页码 -出版社
ROYAL SOC
DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2019.0689
关键词
mental imagery; aphantasia; priming; unconscious
类别
资金
- ERC Consolidator Grant [726251]
- FWO-FWF [G.0020.12N]
- FWO research grant [G0C7416N]
Historically, mental imagery has been defined as a conscious experiential state, but recent research shows minimal differences between conscious and unconscious mental imagery. Treating mental imagery as potentially unconscious can provide explanatory unification to research and reevaluate findings on aphantasia.
Historically, mental imagery has been defined as an experiential state-as something necessarily conscious. But most behavioural or neuroimaging experiments on mental imagery-including the most famous ones-do not actually take the conscious experience of the subject into consideration. Further, recent research highlights that there are very few behavioural or neural differences between conscious and unconscious mental imagery. I argue that treating mental imagery as not necessarily conscious (as potentially unconscious) would bring much needed explanatory unification to mental imagery research. It would also help us to reassess some of the recent aphantasia findings inasmuch as at least some subjects with aphantasia would be best described as having unconscious mental imagery. This article is part of the theme issue 'Offline perception: voluntary and spontaneous perceptual experiences without matching external stimulation'.
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