4.8 Article

Vulnerability Assessment of Conservation Voltage Reduction to Load Redistribution Attack in Unbalanced Active Distribution Networks

期刊

IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRIAL INFORMATICS
卷 17, 期 1, 页码 473-483

出版社

IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC
DOI: 10.1109/TII.2020.2980590

关键词

Optimization; Voltage control; Smart meters; Load modeling; Inverters; Reactive power; Distribution networks; Active distribution network; bilevel optimization; conservation voltage reduction; load redistribution attack

资金

  1. National Research Foundation of Korea - Korean Government (MSIP) [2018R1C1B6000965]
  2. Human Resources Development of the Korea Institute of Energy Technology Evaluation and Planning (KETEP) - Korea Government Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy [20204030200090]
  3. National Research Foundation of Korea [2018R1C1B6000965] Funding Source: Korea Institute of Science & Technology Information (KISTI), National Science & Technology Information Service (NTIS)

向作者/读者索取更多资源

This article introduces a new type of load redistribution attack on a closed-loop conservation voltage reduction (CVR) in an unbalanced three-phase distribution network. The attack strategy aims to maximize three-phase active power flow while ensuring normal CVR operation through the injection of malicious data into smart meters via a bilevel optimization problem. The bilevel optimization problem is eventually transformed into a single-level optimization problem based on Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
This article proposes a new type of load redistribution attack on a closed-loop conservation voltage reduction (CVR) in an unbalanced three-phase distribution network having voltage regulators (an on-load tap changer (OLTC) and capacitor bank), smart inverters for solar photovoltaic and energy storage systems, and smart meters. The objective of the proposed attack strategy using a bilevel optimization problem is to maximize three-phase active power flow from the substation (upper level) while guaranteeing normal CVR operation (lower level) through the injection of malicious data into smart meters. The bilevel optimization problem is finally transformed into a single-level optimization problem based on Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions of the lower level optimization problem. An IEEE 13-node distribution feeder is used to quantify the performance of the proposed attack in terms of voltage level, OLTC tap position, PV penetration rate, and attack effort.

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