期刊
CHAOS
卷 31, 期 1, 页码 -出版社
AIP Publishing
DOI: 10.1063/5.0033335
关键词
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资金
- Humanities and Social Sciences projects of the Ministry of Education [18YJA630057, 20YJC630169]
- Tianjin Philosophy and Social Science Planning Project [TJGLQN19-001]
The study examines individual decision-making under incomplete egoism and celebrity effect through a classification imitation model, revealing the significant role of celebrities in group cooperation decisions. The research finds that incomplete egoism of individuals cannot stimulate cooperation, but can guarantee the stable existence of cooperation.
How long-term cooperation is maintained in a society is an important and interesting question. The evolutionary game theory is often used as the basic framework to study this topic. The social status of game participants has an important influence on individual decision-making. Enlightened by this thought, we present a classification imitation model where the mechanisms of the celebrity effect and incomplete egoism are presented. The celebrity effect is reflected in each strategy update process to probe how individual decision-making is dynamically adjusted by comparing the social status of both parties in the game. The incomplete egoism refers to the irrational imitation of celebrities while self-interest is ignored. With this model, the group cooperation decision-making mechanism led by celebrities is revealed. Large-scale Monte Carlo simulations show that the incomplete egoism of individuals cannot stimulate cooperation but guarantee the stable existence of cooperation. Furthermore, the scale-free and community structure of the network enables cooperation to spread widely and maintains long-term survival. Our conclusion might provide practically new insight into the understanding and controlling of cooperation in the complex social systems.
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