期刊
SUSTAINABILITY
卷 12, 期 19, 页码 -出版社
MDPI
DOI: 10.3390/su12197941
关键词
executive compensation; managerial incentives; corporate social responsibility; corporate social performance; firm risk; delta; vega; agency problem
We use CEO pay sensitivity to stock performance (delta) and stock volatility (vega) to provide empirical evidence that CEO compensation structure influences firm Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) performance. We find that delta has no significant effect on CSR, while vega has a strong, causal relationship with CSR. Our findings suggest that CEOs do not view CSR as value enhancing, but as a way to increase their own compensation through vega. Firms that want to improve their social performance should consider vega as an important compensation incentive for executives.
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