4.7 Article

Securing the Exchange of Synthetic Genetic Constructs Using Digital Signatures

期刊

ACS SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY
卷 9, 期 10, 页码 2656-2664

出版社

AMER CHEMICAL SOC
DOI: 10.1021/acssynbio.0c00401

关键词

DNA; security; cryptography; synthetic biology

资金

  1. NSF [1934573, 1832320]
  2. Colorado State University's Office of the Vice President for Research Catalyst for Innovative Partnerships Program
  3. foundation's Independent Research and Development program for staff
  4. Direct For Biological Sciences
  5. Div Of Biological Infrastructure [1934573] Funding Source: National Science Foundation
  6. Directorate For Engineering
  7. Div Of Civil, Mechanical, & Manufact Inn [1832320] Funding Source: National Science Foundation

向作者/读者索取更多资源

The field of synthetic biology relies on an ever-growing supply chain of synthetic genetic material. Technologies to secure the exchange of this material are still in their infancy. Solutions proposed thus far have focused on watermarks, a dated security approach that can be used to claim authorship, but is subject to counterfeit, and does not provide any information about the integrity of the genetic material itself. In this manuscript, we describe how data encryption and digital signature algorithms can be used to ensure the integrity and authenticity of synthetic genetic constructs. Using a pilot software that generates digital signatures and other encrypted data for plasmids, we demonstrate that we can predictably extract information about the author, the identity, the integrity of plasmid sequences, and even annotations from sequencing data alone without a reference sequence, all without compromising the function of the plasmids. Encoding a digital signature into a DNA molecule provides an avenue for genetic designers to claim authorship of DNA molecules. This technology could help compliance with material transfer agreements and other licensing agreements.

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