期刊
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
卷 67, 期 8, 页码 5194-5208出版社
INFORMS
DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2020.3734
关键词
timely loss recognition; price informativeness; feedback effect
The study shows that a reporting system with more timely disclosure of bad news than good news encourages speculators to trade on private information, leading to higher expected investment levels and firm value.
We examine the effects of asymmetric timeliness in reporting good versus bad news on price informativeness when prices provide useful information to assist firms' investment decisions. We find that a reporting system featuring more timely disclosure of bad news than of good news encourages speculators to trade on their private information. Consequently, it generates a higher expected investment level and firm value. Our analysis generates predictions consistent with empirical findings and provides a justification for the more timely reporting of bad news in the absence of managerial incentive problems.
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