4.7 Article

How does alliance-based government-university-industry foster cleantech innovation in a green innovation ecosystem?

期刊

JOURNAL OF CLEANER PRODUCTION
卷 283, 期 -, 页码 -

出版社

ELSEVIER SCI LTD
DOI: 10.1016/j.jclepro.2020.124559

关键词

Evolutionary game; Green innovation ecosystem; Stabilization; Government-university-industry; Cleantech innovation; Collaborative innovation

资金

  1. major project of the Postdoctoral Research Foundation of Heilongjiang Province [LBH-Q19114]
  2. Philosophy and Social Science Foundation of Heilongjiang Province [17GLB025]
  3. Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities [HEUCFP 201828]

向作者/读者索取更多资源

The study addresses the challenges of the green innovation ecosystem, including instability due to high costs and low profits. It highlights the importance of stricter environmental regulations in overcoming market failures and promoting stability in innovation alliances between government, industry, and universities.
Addressing the high research and development risk and negative externality of existing green technology alliances, the Chinese government is focusing on the green innovation ecosystem to facilitate the green collaborative innovation activities of the government-university-industry alliance. However, green innovation ecosystems often suffer from insufficient stability because of high costs, low profits, and long-term return on investment for cleantech innovation. The existing literature analyzed the impact of environmental regulation on cleantech innovation and the effect of innovation ecosystem on the function and role of multi-agent collaborative innovation. However, what are key factors affecting the stabilization of the green innovation ecosystem, and what the effects of environmental regulation policies on the multi-agent collaborative innovation in this ecosystem? To fill these gaps, unlike previous studies in the green innovation literature, this study employed game-based theory to reveal the game strategy changes during the green innovation process, and examine the evolutionary game mechanism of environmental regulation in university-industry ecological innovation alliances. On this basis, the case simulation method is used to change parameter values to simulate key factors that affect the stability of the green innovation ecosystem in multi-agent collaborative innovation. Research shows that there will be two final strategies for evolutionary game analysis: first, industry groups and university groups will adopt the collaborative innovation strategy; second. industry groups and university groups will adopt the betrayal alliance strategy. In the market mechanism, higher default costs and the distribution ratio of research and development costs and green innovation benefits are key factors effecting the stabilization of the green innovation ecosystem. However, the introduction of stricter environmental regulations can make up for shortcomings of the market failure. Specifically, the penalty costs and innovation subsidies that the government offers to industry groups and university groups have a positive correlation with the stabilization of the green innovation ecosystem. (C) 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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